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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Declaration of Independence was transformational because 
it declared the independence of the American colonies from England and 
incorporated democratic ideals. In 1776, most European countries were 
governed by monarchs, some of which had (at one point, at least) 
purported to rule by Divine Right. In the Declaration of Independence, 
the signers implicitly rejected the idea of Divine Right by flatly asserting 
their right to throw off a despotic monarch and declaring that the power 
to govern derives from the consent of the governed.1 As the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 quoting James 
Madison, “the Constitution created a form of government under which 
‘The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty,’” 
dispersing “power in reflection of the people’s distrust of concentrated 
power, and of power itself at all levels,” thus creating an entirely new 
form of government “from the British form, under which the Crown was 
sovereign and the people were subjects.” 
In the Constitution, freedom of speech was not initially regarded as an 
indispensable component. Indeed, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
believed that a bill of rights (which would have included specific 
protections for free speech) was not needed because they had created a 
government of limited and enumerated powers3—one whose power was 
sufficiently checked by the doctrine of separation of powers and other 
 
 * Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville, Louis 
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 1. See generally The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). 
 2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1976). 
 3. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8. 
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limitations built into the new Constitution.4 However, the people 
disagreed, and it rapidly became clear that the Constitution might not 
have enough support to gain ratification without the addition of a formal 
bill of rights.5 In an effort to salvage the Constitution, proponents urged 
ratification of the document “as is,” but promised that the first Congress 
would create what became the Bill of Rights.6 Only then was ratification 
possible.7 As a result, the Bill of Rights (and the right to freedom of 
expression) entered the Constitution as an amendment rather than in the 
body of the Constitution itself.8 
Over time, it became apparent that freedom of expression and freedom 
of the press were indispensable components of the U.S. governmental 
system.9 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “Speech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of 
self-government.”10 In a democratic system, change does not simply 
 
 4. See Ralph Ketcham, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention 
Debates: The Clashes and the Compromises That Gave Birth to Our Form of Government 6 (1986) 
(“Also, mindful of colonial experience and following the arguments of Montesquieu, the idea that 
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers had to be ‘separated,’ made to ‘check and balance’ 
each other in order to prevent tyranny, gained wide acceptance.”). 
 5. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 78, 92–93 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (“During the 
debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification of the Constitution, one of the arguments 
frequently used by opponents of ratification was that without a Bill of Rights guaranteeing 
individual liberty the new general Government carried with it a potential for tyranny.”). 
 6. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 769 (2010) (“But those who were 
fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe traditional rights such as the right to keep 
and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the Bill of Rights as a condition for ratification of the 
Constitution.”). 
 7. See id. at 769 (“But those who were fearful that the new Federal Government would 
infringe traditional rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights as a condition for ratification of the Constitution.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The first 10 Amendments were not enacted because 
the members of the First Congress came up with a bright idea one morning; rather, their enactment 
was forced upon Congress by a number of the States as a condition for their ratification of the 
original Constitution.”). 
 8. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769. 
 9. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. Rev. 964 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877 (1963); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment as an 
Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245; Russell L. Weaver & Catherine Hancock, The First 
Amendment: Cases, Materials and Problems (Carolina Academic Press, 6th ed., 2020). 
 10. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 74–75 (1964)); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (“core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position”); see also Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and press was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people.”). 
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“happen,” but is instead driven by the people, and the “constitutional 
safeguard [for free expression] ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people,’” so that “changes may be obtained by lawful 
means.”11 Indeed, free speech is so important to the U.S. governmental 
system that former U.S. Supreme Court nominee, Robert Bork argued 
that the “entire structure of the Constitution creates a representative 
democracy, a form of government that would be meaningless without 
freedom to discuss government and its policies.”12 Bork believed that 
protections for political speech are so essential to the democratic process 
that they “could and should be inferred even if there were no first 
amendment.”13 He defined political speech as “criticisms of public 
officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation 
or constitutional provisions and speech addressed to the conduct of any 
governmental unit in the country.”14 
“Fake news” creates problems for democratic systems because it has 
the potential to mislead the public, and undermine the quality of public 
debate through the use of false facts. Social media is a frequent source of 
fake news. For example, Twitter accounts have provided a major source 
of propaganda and misinformation.15 During the 2016 election, the 
Twitter Data Science Team found some 50,000 Russia-linked accounts 
that were spreading disinformation, and it also found that disinformation 
was being spread by both Republican and Democratic partisans.16 
 
 11. New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) & Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)); see also 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339, 341 (2010) (“Speech is an essential 
mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. The right 
of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a pre-
condition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The First 
Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for 
political office.'” “It is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to 
obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.”); see also 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (“[L]awful political speech [is] at the core of what 
the First Amendment is designed to protect.”). 
 12. See Bork, supra note 9, at 23; see also id. at 20 (“Constitutional protection should be 
accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to 
protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call 
obscene or pornographic.”). 
 13. Id. at 23. 
 14. Id. at 29. 
 15. Farhad Manjoo, How Twitter is Being Gamed to Feed Misinformation, N.Y. Times, 
June 1, 2017, at B-1, B-7 (“But the biggest problem with Twitter’s place in the news is its role in 
the production and dissemination of propaganda and misinformation.”). This article offers the 
example of a conspiracy theory suggesting that the murder of a staffer at the Democratic National 
Committee was linked to the leak of Clinton campaign emails. Id. at B-7. 
 16. Matthew Hindman & Vlad Barash, Disinformation, ‘Fake News’ and Influence 
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Facebook has nearly two billion users worldwide,17 “reaches 
approximately 67% of U.S. adults,” and 44% of U.S. adults state that they 
receive their news from Facebook.18 As a result, “digging up large-scale 
misinformation on Facebook was as easy as finding baby photos or 
birthday greetings.”19 Included “were doctored photos . . . of Latin 
American migrants headed towards the United States border,” as well as 
“easily disprovable lies about the women who accused Justice Brett M. 
Kavanaugh of sexual assault, cooked up by partisans with bad-faith 
agendas.”20 Indeed, “every time major political events dominated the 
news cycle, Facebook was overrun by hoaxers and conspiracy theorists, 
who used the platform to sow discord, spin falsehoods and stir up tribal 
anger.”21 For example, during the 2016 presidential campaign, 
conspiracy theorists circulated false internet rumors to the effect that then 
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and her campaign manager were 
operating a child sex ring out of a restaurant.22 
The situation is complicated further by two other phenomena: “bots” 
and “deep fakes.” In recent years, “robotic speech bots” (bots) are 
increasingly able to disseminate speech on a mass scale.23 Indeed, in 
some instances, bots can even create the content that is disseminated. 
“Deep fakes” involve video content that has been altered in some way.24 
For example, in 2019, someone altered a video of House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi to make it appear that she was drunk and slurring her speech.25 
This false impression was possible because the pace of the video was 
slowed down and the pitch of her voice was raised as well.26 In another 
 
Campaigns on Twitter, Knight Found., Oct. 2018, at 4, 33. 
 17. Dr. Joel Timmer, Fighting Falsity: Fake News, Facebook and the First Amendment, 35 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 669, 672 (2017). 
 18. Id. at 672–73. 
 19. Kevin Roose, Facebook Thwarted Chaos on Election Day. It’s Hardly Clear That Will 
Last., N.Y. Times: The Shift, Nov. 8, 2018, at B1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Jennifer Ludden, Armed Man Threatens D.C. Pizzeria Targeted by Fake News 
Stories, Nat’l Pub. Radio: All Things Considered (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/ 
12/05/504467162/armed-man-threatens-d-c-pizzeria-targeted-by-fake-news-stories. 
 23. See Manjoo, supra note 15, at B-7. 
 24. Grace Shao, What ‘Deepfakes’ Are and How They May Be Dangerous, CNBC 
(Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/what-isfdeepfake-and-how-it-might-be-
dangerous.html. 
 25. Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk, Spread Across 
Social Media, Wash. Post (May 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology 
/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunk-spread-across-social-media/. 
 26. Id. 
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instance, someone altered a video of former President Barrack Obama to 
make it appear that he was saying something that he did not say.27 
This Article explores the problems related to fake news, bots and deep 
fakes. In addition to discussing the problems that they pose for public 
debate, it examines whether society has effective ways to deal with these 
problems. 
I.  FAKE NEWS 
Fake news, or inaccurate and misleading information, is nothing new. 
Some individuals have always been willing to spread lies or inaccurate 
information about others.28 However, with the development of the 
internet, the problem has become much worse.29 For centuries, 
information passed between people by word of mouth or by handwritten 
methods, but generally information moved at the pace at which people 
could move.30 Not until the fifteenth century, when Johannes Gutenberg 
invented the printing press,31 did it become possible to easily create 
multiple copies of documents.32 Although the printing press did not 
increase the speed at which information could disseminate, the ability to 
create multiple copies allowed information to spread more broadly. This 
led to a flowering of knowledge, information and ideas, which ultimately 
 
 27. Hallie Jackson, Fake Obama Warning about ‘Deep Fakes’ Goes Viral, MSNBC (Apr. 
19, 2018), https://www.msnbc.com/hallie-jackson/watch/fake-obama-warning-about-deep-fakes-
goes -viral-1214598723984. 
 28. See Jacob Soll, The Long and Brutal History of Fake News, Politico (Dec. 18, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent-214535. 
Political debate his involved not only outright lies, but also satire and ridicule. See Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54–55 (1988) (“Despite their sometimes caustic nature, 
from the early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic 
depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate. 
Nast’s castigation of the Tweed Ring, Walt McDougall’s characterization of Presidential 
candidate James G. Blaine’s banquet with the millionaires at Delmonico’s as ‘The Royal Feast of 
Belshazzar,’ and numerous other efforts have undoubtedly had an effect on the course and 
outcome of contemporaneous debate. Lincoln’s tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt’s glasses 
and teeth, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s jutting jaw and cigarette holder have been memorialized 
by political cartoons with an effect that could not have been obtained by the photographer or the 
portrait artist. From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have 
been considerably poorer without them.”). 
 29. See Russell L. Weaver, From Gutenberg to the Internet: Free Speech, Advancing 
Technology, and the Implications for Democracy 139–58 (2nd ed. 2019). 
 30. Id. at 3. Of course, over the centuries, there were attempts to move information more 
quickly than people could move. Id. at 4. Information could move faster than people could move 
through the use of carrier pigeons. Id. at 4. However, although pigeons could discreetly 
communicate a particular piece of information relatively quickly, they were not suited to mass 
communication in the sense of the modern radio, television or internet. Id. 
 31. Id. at 9–11. 
 32. Id. at 10–11. 
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contributed to dramatic societal changes, including the scientific 
revolution, the demise of monarchy and the Protestant Reformation.33 
Following Gutenberg’s development of the printing press, 
communication technologies did not advance markedly until the 
nineteenth century.34 At that point, the harnessing of electricity led to the 
development of a series of new electrically-based communication 
technologies, including the telegraph, radio, television, and eventually 
satellite and cable technologies.35 These new technologies allowed 
information to move much more quickly than the speed at which people 
could move.36 The telegraph reduced the time required to send a message 
across the United States from a matter of weeks to a few seconds.37 Radio 
made it possible for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to transmit his 
fireside chats to every house in the U.S. almost simultaneously.38 
Television made it possible to communicate through both audio and video 
content in real time.39 
Even though these new communication technologies revolutionized 
communication in important aspects, this technology came with one 
major drawback: they were almost invariably owned and controlled by 
relatively rich individuals or corporations who became the “gatekeepers” 
of those technologies.40 Even the printing press, which was relatively 
cheap in comparison to other modern communication technologies (e.g., 
satellites), could be relatively expensive and difficult to obtain.41 
Benjamin Franklin, who was known as a printer (among many other 
things), came from a family of limited means and struggled for many 
years to acquire the funds needed to buy a printing press.42 He ultimately 
obtained one only with the help of a partner, and due to the demise of a 
former employer’s printing business that resulted in a fire sale price for a 
printing press.43 
Those who controlled communication technologies had the power to 
decide who could use those technologies, as well as the messages that 
could be communicated over them.44 Predictably, the owners of 
communication platforms would only allow the dissemination of 
 
 33. Id. at 13–14. 
 34. Id. at 39–46.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 39–40. 
 38. Id. at 47–60. 
 39. Id. at 44–45. 
 40. Id. at 47–60. 
 41. Id. at 33–34. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 34. 
 44. Id. at 34–38. 
 
2019] FAKE NEWS (& DEEP FAKES) AND DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE 41 
 
information that favored their views and positions.45 As a result, although 
there were dramatic advances in communication technologies over the 
centuries, these new technologies were not readily accessible by ordinary 
individuals.46 Ideas and political arguments might or might not be 
communicated, depending on the whims of those who owned the 
communication technologies.47 
The internet was transformative because it was the first technology 
that allowed ordinary individuals to communicate on a mass scale,48 and 
generally allowed them to do so free of the censorship of the traditional 
gatekeepers and filters on communication.49 This broadening of 
communicative capacity had a profound impact on modern societies, 
enabling mass communication on a scale never seen before, and resulting 
in significant societal changes.50 The impact of the internet has been seen 
in contexts ranging from President Barrack Obama’s 2008 presidential 
campaign, which used the internet very effectively to organize and recruit 
supporters, and raise money,51 to the Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle 
East.52 The impact has also been seen in a multitude of other contexts.53 
The greatest strength of the internet—the enabling of mass 
communication by ordinary individuals—has also proved to be its 
greatest weakness.54 By enabling ordinary people to engage in mass 
communication, the internet has created the potential for mischief. Some 
have used the internet to perpetrate fraud (haven’t we all received emails 
from Africa soliciting help in moving money out of Africa for a 
handsome fee?) and has also enabled those who wish to propagate fake 
news. Using platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, individuals can 
easily distribute “facts,” both real and fake. Moreover, because the 
internet is global in nature, individuals have the ability to distribute 
information across international borders. As a result, during the 2016 
presidential election, some believed that Russian operatives attempted to 
influence the outcome of the election in favor of Donald Trump.55 
The impact of internet speech is amplified by bots and deep fakes. 
Bots enable individuals to distribute their ideas broadly, and even give 
 
 45. Id. at 36. 
 46. Id. at 35–38. 
 47. Id. at 36–37. 
 48. Id. at 67–70.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 67–114. 
 51. Id. at 102–104. 
 52. Id. at 73–82. 
 53. Id. at 67–114. 
 54. Id. at 139–170. 
 55. See Stephen Budiansky, The Coming War for Cyberspace, Wall St. J., July 15–16, 2017, 
at C5 (“An army of Russia-based human and automated attackers (“robo-trolls”) deluged the 
United States with pro-Trump disinformation . . .”). 
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them the possibility of using bots to create new and additional speech on 
their behalf. Deep fakes allow individuals to use new technologies to 
created distorted views showing things that never actually happened.  
A.  Possible Responses to Fake News, Bots, and Deep Fakes 
Fake news and deep fakes are inconsistent with the notion of informed 
self-government because they have the potential to mislead the voting 
public. At its worst, “fake news” can distort the public debate with ideas 
or facts that are made up and simply untrue.  
Of course, the usual remedy for offensive or false speech is counter 
speech that attempts to set the record straight and helps inform the public 
of the truth. Whether this remedy is effective with fake news is unclear. 
After President Obama was elected President of the United States, there 
were those who questioned whether he was born in the United States, and 
thus whether he was eligible to serve as President.56 While there was 
plenty of counter-speech, including President Obama’s production of a 
copy of his birth certificate, rumors regarding President Obama’s birth 
status continued to circulate.57 Accordingly, it is not clear that responsive 
speech will always set the record straight, nor that the public will accept 
the truth even if it is made available. 
B.  Governmental Regulation of Fake News? 
Should there be more stringent remedies against fake news? For 
example, should government be entitled to declare that “fake news,” 
being false, is not entitled to constitutional protection? In other words, 
can it treat fake news like fighting words,58 child pornography,59 or 
obscenity,60 and thus impose criminal sanctions on those who propagate 
it? Should government also have the power to impose civil or criminal 
sanctions on those who circulate fake news, or may it impose licensing 
restrictions or seek injunctive relief against fake news?  
Any attempt to regulate fake news might lead to a number of thorny 
questions regarding the proper role of government in our constitutional 
system. Let us begin by assuming that Congress decides to create a new 
federal agency to regulate fake news, the Federal Truth Commission 
(Truth Commission). Would we, as a society, feel comfortable giving the 
Truth Commission the power to determine which ideas and facts are 
 
 56. See Ashley Parker & Steve Eder, How Trump’s ‘Birther’ Claims Helped to Stir 
Presidential Bid, N.Y. Times, July 3, 2016, at A1. 
 57. See Sophie Tatum & Jim Acosta, Report: Trump Continues to Question Obama’s Birth 
Certificate, CNN (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/28/politics/donald-trump-
barack-obama-birth-certificate-nyt/index.html. 
 58. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 59. See generally Ferber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 60. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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“true,” and which are “false,” and to prosecute those who espouse ideas 
and facts that the commission regards as completely false? Would we feel 
comfortable giving the Truth Commission the power to license news, 
based on its truth or falsity, and the power to seek injunctive relief against 
false facts and ideas? 
If the Truth Commission were given such authority, how would it go 
about determining what qualifies as “fake news?” In order to qualify as 
false, must something be “completely false,” or could something be 
regarded as “fake news” simply because it is biased or slanted in favor of 
one side of a debate? For example, during the Obama Administration, 
suppose that the Truth Commission had existed, and decided that climate 
change was a “fact” and that climate change denial was fake news. Could 
the Truth Commission have criminally prosecuted those who argued that 
climate change was a hoax? Would the Truth Commission have been free 
to redefine the truth regarding climate change when Donald Trump came 
to power? In other words, could the Truth Commission have changed its 
definition of “truth,” dismissed all charges against climate change 
deniers, and criminally prosecuted those who were arguing that climate 
change is a real phenomenon? Would we, as a society, feel comfortable 
giving the government the power to declare that facts like these are 
undeniably true, and that anyone who dissents can be subject to criminal 
sanctions? 
Of course, the Truth Commission might be given the power to prohibit 
not only “completely false” ideas or facts, but also to prohibit biased or 
partially false statements. In other words, the Truth Commission might 
be given the power to impose the equivalent of the Federal 
Communication Commission’s “fairness doctrine,”61 but instead extend 
that doctrine beyond broadcasting to all communications disseminated by 
newspapers, cable television, the internet and satellite.  
If the Truth Commission were given the power to prosecute for bias 
or lack of “fairness,” it could have many players on either side of the 
political spectrum to prosecute. Those on the left might argue that Fox 
News and other right-wing commentators should be criminally 
prosecuted for their allegedly biased views and statements. At the same 
time, those on the right, who believe that the media has a left-wing bias, 
might argue for the prosecution of a wide swath of left-wing journalists. 
Although I would personally find it offensive to prosecute anyone for 
simply expressing their ideas, no matter how biased or slanted, if I were 
forced (at gun point on threat of death) to name a news personality who 
exhibits extreme bias and lack of objectivity, I would name a particular 
National Public Radio program host whose work I often find is 
 
 61. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) 
(holding that the “Fairness Doctrine” required that broadcasters’ discussion of public issues give 
fair coverage to both sides of those issues). 
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unreasonably partisan. Would the Federal Truth Commission be free to 
criminally prosecute the NPR host for biased news coverage? Would the 
host have a defense if there is some truth to his statements of fact and 
articulated ideas? In other words, could he only be convicted if his 
allegations and reporting are totally false?  
A more difficult question arises if government is given the power to 
prosecute ideas which have elements of truth: but which can be regarded 
as biased or slanted? Vested with that kind of authority, I’m sure that the 
Trump Administration would be able to find several biased journalists to 
prosecute. Would we feel comfortable giving Trump that authority? 
Of course, some nations have already attempted to declare truth and 
criminally prosecute those who transgress their versions of truth. For 
example, France currently makes it a crime to deny that the Holocaust 
occurred.62 However, it is not clear that such crimes provide effective 
deterrents. There is no evidence that France’s ban on Holocaust denial 
has eliminated Holocaust deniers from France.63 On the contrary, France 
is still home to Holocaust deniers.64 Moreover, despite the U.S.’s failure 
to prohibit Holocaust denial, there is no evidence that Holocaust deniers 
have won the day in the United States. 
Any attempt to establish a Truth Commission and to allow prosecution 
of political and news commentators for false statements would run 
directly counter to the nation’s free speech traditions. In United States v. 
Alvarez,65 the Court struck down portions of the Stolen Valor Act and 
concluded that Congress could not impose criminal sanctions on those 
who falsely claim to have won the Congressional Medal of Honor. In 
Alvarez, the Court flatly rejected the proposition that false speech has no 
value, and therefore should be denied constitutional protection.66 In doing 
so, the Court expressed concern that the government might try to create 
something like the Truth Commission (referencing George Orwell’s 
Oceania Ministry of Truth), and empower it with the authority to 
“compile a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable.”67 
The Court referred to this type of power as being a “broad censorial 
power,” which the Court viewed as “unprecedented in this Court’s cases 
or in our constitutional tradition,” and one which involves “a chill the 
 
 62. See Russell L. Weaver, N. Delpierre & L. Boissier, Holocause Denial and 
Governmentally Declared “Truth”: French and American Perspectives, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
495, 497 (2009). 
 63. Id. at 498. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 66. Id. at 718–19. The Court did note that certain types of false speech could be criminally 
prosecuted such as perjury or filing a false claim with the U.S. government. See id. at 734. 
 67. Id. at 723. 
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First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are 
to remain a foundation of our freedom.”68 
Alvarez is consistent with the Court’s general free speech 
jurisprudence. If the legitimacy of our governmental system depends on 
the consent of the governed, it is inappropriate to give government the 
power to control, limit and suppress the range of ideas that the people can 
hear or consider. In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,69 the 
Court declared that as “a general matter, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”70 Likewise, in Cohen v. 
California, the Court flatly recognized that the “constitutional right of 
free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous 
as ours,” and concluded that it “is designed and intended to remove 
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the 
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each 
of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more 
capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other 
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and 
choice upon which our political system rests.”71 Cohen went on to state 
that it would not “indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid 
particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing 
ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the 
censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the 
expression of unpopular views. We have been able . . . to discern little 
social benefit that might result from running the risk of opening the door 
to such grave results.”72 
Limitations on government’s ability to control or censor speech are 
grounded in history and in our constitutional tradition. After Johannes 
Gutenberg invented the printing press in the fifteenth century, many 
countries feared that widespread use of the press might undermine their 
power, and therefore they sought to control and limit its use.73 The 
English government used the decision in de Libellis Famosis,74 to 
criminally prosecute those who criticized the Crown or certain religious 
officials of high station, and it did so in an effort to prosecute, intimidate 
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and silence governmental critics.75 Moreover, under English law, a 
defendant could not rely on the defense of truth; indeed, truth was treated 
as an aggravating factor. “Since maintaining a proper regard for 
government was the goal of this new offense, it followed that truth was 
just as reprehensible as falsehood and was eliminated as a defense.”76 
Similar restrictions were imposed in the American colonies where the 
British prosecuted “criticism directed against the government or public 
officials” because it was considered to be “a threat against public order 
and a criminal offense,” and again truth was not a defense.77 For example, 
British colonial officials prosecuted John Peter Zenger, a New York 
publisher, for seditious libel for publishing stories mocking the royal 
Governor and his administration.78 Among other things, Zenger 
published “anti-British song-sheets and mock advertisements describing 
an associate of the royal governor as ‘a large Spaniel, of about 5 feet 5 
inches high . . . lately strayed from his kennel with his mouth full of 
fulsome panegyricks,’ and a ‘monkey . . . lately broke from his chain and 
run into the country.’”79 The Royal Governor eventually managed to 
indict Zenger for seditious libel.80 When the case was finally tried, 
Zenger’s lawyer admitted that Zenger had published the allegedly 
libelous statements, and offered to concede the libel if the prosecution 
could prove that the allegations were false. When the prosecution 
declined, Zenger’s attorney offered to prove that the statements were true. 
Although the court disallowed the evidence, on the valid legal basis that 
truth was immaterial, the jury chose to acquit Zenger in a decision that 
history has portrayed as an early example of jury nullification.81 
Based on this history of speech repression, some commentators have 
argued that the First Amendment was designed to eliminate seditious 
libel, and to provide broad protections for freedom of expression. For 
example, Zechariah Chafee argued that the Framers of the First 
Amendment intended to “wipe out the common law of sedition, and make 
further prosecutions for criticism of the government, without any 
incitement to law-breaking, forever impossible.”82 Although Leonard W. 
Levy disputed the idea that the First Amendment was intended “to 
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eliminate the law of seditious libel,”83 he agreed that the “American 
people of 1787 understood . . . that they were entitled to an explicit 
reservation of their rights against government, that a bill of rights is a bill 
of restraints upon government, and that people may be free only if the 
government is not.”84 
Early experiences under the U.S. Constitution were not necessarily 
consistent with this anti-repression principle. Less than a decade after the 
First Amendment was framed and ratified, Congress enacted the Alien 
and Sedition Act of 1798, which made it illegal to publish “false, 
scandalous, and malicious writing against the Government of the United 
States with intent to defame, or to bring them into contempt or disrepute, 
or to excite against them hatred of the good people of the United States, 
or to stir up sedition within the United States.”85  
In its more modern decisions, the Court has been sensitive to the 
history of speech repression in both the U.S. and Europe, and quite 
protective when the government seeks to repress core political speech. In 
general, the Court’s decisions have suggested that the government should 
not be allowed to control either thought or speech. As the Court stated in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, “First Amendment freedoms are most 
in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its 
laws for that impermissible end.86 The right to think is the beginning of 
freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because 
speech is the beginning of thought.” Likewise, in Virginia v. Black, the 
Court stated that the “hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow 
free trade in ideas—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people 
might find distasteful or discomforting.”87 This point has been made in 
many different ways. For example, Professor Emerson argued that the 
“only justification for suppressing an opinion is that those who seek to 
suppress it are infallible in their judgment of the truth. But no individual 
or group can be infallible, particularly in a constantly changing world.”88 
As a result, “through the acquisition of new knowledge, the toleration of 
new ideas, the testing of opinion in open competition, the discipline of 
rethinking its assumptions, a society will be better able to reach common 
decisions that will meet the needs and aspirations of its members.”89 
However, there is one situation in which fake news can be prohibited, 
as well as bots and deep fakes: when the speech comes from outside the 
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U.S. and is designed to interfere in U.S. elections. Federal law prohibits 
such interference. 
C.  Injunctions and Licensing as Possible Remedies? 
An alternate (or, perhaps, supplementary) approach is to give the 
Truth Commission two other powers: (1) to review and license new 
stories before they are published, and (2) to seek injunctive relief against 
fake, biased or slanted news. Under such an arrangement, the Truth 
Commission could require that all facts and all new stories be submitted 
to it prior to publication, and the law could further provide that nobody 
could publish anything without the explicit authority of the Truth 
Commission. The Truth Commission would then have the power to 
refuse to license any story that it regards as false. Alternatively, if 
someone published facts or stories without gaining the Truth 
Commission’s approval, it could be given the authority to seek injunctive 
relief against the publication of such stories. They could also seek 
injunctive relief against biased or “unfair” news or ideas.  
Of course, both a licensing power and an injunctive power would run 
directly counter to the long-established prohibition against prior 
restraints.90 In the Court’s landmark decision in Near v. Minnesota, the 
Court emphasized that the constitutional protection for liberty of the press 
was designed to prohibit “previous restraints upon publication.”91 
Likewise, in Patterson v. Colorado, the Court declared that the “main 
purpose” of the First Amendment’s provisions is “to prevent all such 
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other 
governments.”92 
The prohibition against prior restraints is also rooted in history. After 
Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press, many countries sought 
to control and limit its use.93 In addition to restricting the number of 
printing presses that could exist, England imposed content licensing 
restrictions.94 In other words, before an individual could publish a book 
or document, the government required the individual to submit the 
content of the book to governmental censors, who could veto the 
publication or require modifications to the content (usually modifications 
designed to mute or eliminate criticism of the King or the clergy).95 In 
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general, in the U.S., such speech licensing schemes are prohibited. In 
Lovell v. City of Griffin,96 the Court struck down an ordinance which 
required that the written permission of the city manager must be obtained 
before anyone could distribute circulars, advertising, or literature of any 
kind in the City of Griffin. In doing so, the Court emphasized that the law 
stuck “at the very foundation of the freedom of press by subjecting it to 
license and censorship.”97 Noting that the “struggle for the freedom of the 
press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor,” the Court 
held the ordinance was invalid because it “would restore the system of 
license and censorship in its baldest form.”98 
The Court has also denied injunctions against speech.99 In Near v. 
Minnesota, the Court struck down a Minnesota law which authorized the 
abatement of any “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, 
magazine or other periodical.”100 The case involved an attempt to enjoin 
publication of The Saturday Post because it was “largely devoted to 
malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles.”101 Reaffirming the 
prohibition against prior restraints, the Court held that the Minnesota law 
imposed “an unconstitutional restraint upon publication.”102  
Thus, it is extremely unlikely that the Truth Commission could 
impose a licensing scheme, requiring that publishers obtain its permission 
before publishing information, or that it could use injunctions to prohibit 
the publication of “fake news.”  
D.  Other Potential Remedies? 
If Congress cannot vest the Truth Commission with the power to 
criminally prosecute or enjoin the publication of fake news, then are there 
other potential remedies for fake news or against the perpetrators of such 
news?  
In appropriate cases, one potential remedy is to bring a defamation 
suit against someone who propagates fake news that injures another’s 
reputation. As discussed previously, if the plaintiff is a public official or 
a public figure, it is extremely difficult to prevail in defamation litigation. 
However, if an allegation really does involve “fake news,” in the sense 
that the defendant is “making it up,” it should be possible for even a 
public official or a public figure to satisfy the more stringent actual malice 
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standard imposed under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. But the 
effectiveness of this remedy is undercut by the nature of the internet. Fake 
information can be disseminated from all parts of the globe. Even if a 
potential plaintiff could locate the purveyor of false information, which 
might be difficult since it is often conveyed anonymously, the purveyor 
may be judgment proof. At the very least, the plaintiff may be forced to 
sue in a foreign country in order to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. 
All things considered, a defamation suit might not be worth the trouble.  
Another potential remedy may be responsive speech. Certainly, the 
government could at times weigh in with its own version of truth. To a 
greater or lesser extent, government has always engaged in attempts to 
influence public opinion. For example, the Obama Administration argued 
in favor of its view of climate change, and the Trump Administration has 
adopted its own (contrary) view of climate change. Likewise, even 
though Holocaust deniers cannot be prosecuted in the U.S., the 
government has not remained neutral on the question of whether the 
Holocaust actually occurred. Indeed, it helped establish the Holocaust 
Memorial Museum. Of course, many people are distrustful of 
government, particularly the U.S. government, and it is not clear whether 
the American people would be inclined to accept the declarations of a 
Truth Commission as the true and last word on any issue. 
E.  Third Party Remedies 
Given the decline of the traditional media, and the rise of the internet, 
much speech now runs through private entities such as Twitter and 
Facebook.103 In recent years, these private entities have tended to assert 
much greater control over the speech that occurs on their networks.104 
This trend can be regarded as positive in that private entities may be 
making much greater efforts to control fake news and other harmful 
speech.105 However, the trend can also be troubling in the sense that 
private companies are serving as gatekeepers, as they are attempting to 
censor and control the flow of ideas to the public.106 
Governmental regulation of private networks would have troubling 
First Amendment implications. For example, suppose that the Truth 
Commission sought to prohibit private networks (such as Twitter or 
Facebook) from transmitting fake information. Could the private 
networks be criminally prosecuted when fake news is aired through their 
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systems? Alternatively, could they be subject to content licensing or 
injunctions in order to prevent them from transmitting fake news? 
Presumably, any attempt by the Truth Commission to act against private 
networks would run afoul of the same constitutional restrictions that 
would arise if the Truth Commission tried to act against private 
individuals. 
One potential restriction on private networks might be valid: a 
disclosure requirement. During the 2016 presidential campaign, concerns 
were expressed regarding the fact that foreign entities (allegedly, the 
Russian government) were trying to influence the outcome of the U.S. 
election through such devices as fake advertisements run on Facebook.107 
There has been some talk of requiring companies like Facebook to reveal 
the sources of their advertisements.108 If that were done, it would at least 
be more apparent when outsiders are trying to influence a U.S. election. 
As private entities, social media networks can exercise a higher degree 
of editorial control than the government can exercise.109 However, for a 
variety of reasons, their attempts to exercise such control can be 
troubling. Those who operate social media platforms may have 
ideological or political biases, and may use their censorial power to favor 
information that accords with their view and biases.110 In addition, so 
much “fake news” is distributed over social media platforms that the 
reviewers are overwhelmed and have very little time to fairly evaluate 
information before censoring it.111 
CONCLUSION 
Democratic government is premised upon the consent of the 
governed, and freedom of expression is essential to the effective 
expression of that consent. Attempts to undermine freedom of expression, 
through the injection of fake or false news into the public debate, is 
particularly troubling in democratic systems because it tends to 
undermine the quality of the public debate. 
The difficulty is that there are no effective legal solutions to the 
dissemination of fake news. In the U.S., it will typically be highly 
offensive for the government to criminally prosecute those who 
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propagate false information, and injunctions would be regarded as 
anathema as a prior restraint on publication.  
In the final analysis, James Madison’s lament regarding the press 
remains as true today as it was then: “That this liberty [press liberty] is 
often carried to excess; that it has sometimes degenerated into 
licentiousness, is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not yet been 
discovered. Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with which it 
is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk 
without wounding vitally the plant from which it is torn.”112 Similar 
principles apply to governmental regulation of fake news: the remedy 
may be worse than the disease. In the U.S. system, the only potentially 
effective response to fake news is responsive speech that points out the 
defects and lies inherent in that speech. 
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